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DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROTECTION FROM
CIVIL SANCTIONS AFTER HUDSON V.
UNITED STATES
Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct 488 (1997).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1989, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency
("OCC"), a federal administrative agency, imposed monetary
penalties and occupational debarment on three bank officials
from Oklahoma for violating several federal banking statutes
and regulations.' The officials were later indicted on criminal
charges arising from the same conduct, and subsequently
moved to dismiss the criminal charges, claiming that the Double
Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment protected them from
being punished in a second proceeding.2 A United States Dis-
trict Court dismissed the indictments, but the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the indictments, rely-
ing on the double jeopardy test set forth in United States v. Hal-
per, and finding that the actual fines imposed by the OCC in the
civil proceeding were not so grossly disproportionate to the
costs of the Government as to constitute punishment under the
Court's double jeopardy standard .
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Tenth Cir-
cuit, holding that the civil sanctions imposed on the bankers
were not "criminal punishment" in the sense required to trigger
the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 In doing so,
' See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 492 (1997), aff'g 92 F.d 1026 (10th
Cir. 1996).
See id.
3 See United States v. Hudson, 879 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. OkI. 1994), rev'd, 92 F.3d
1026 (10th Cir. 1996), affd, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
See United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996), revk 879 F. Supp.
1113 (W.D. Ok. 1994), af'd, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997). See United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 448 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
" See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496.
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the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause.5 In doing so,
however, the Court "disavow[ed] the method of analysis used in
United States v. Halper and reaffirm[ed] the previously estab-
lished rule exemplified in United States v. Ward."
6
This Note addresses the extent to which an individual may
hope to be granted double jeopardy protection from civil penal-
ties assessed by the State. Part II outlines some basic principles
underlying the double jeopardy doctrine, and the development
of the doctrine through the case law. Part III describes the facts
and procedural history of the Hudson case. Part IV summarizes
the opinions of the Court in the Hudson case, and Part V con-
cludes with some thoughts on the implications of the Hudson
decision for the interests protected by the Double Jeopardy
Clause.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DOUBLEJEOPARDY DOCTRINE
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment states
that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb."7 The philosophy underlying the
Clause is that "the State with all its resources and power should
not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individ-
ual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embar-
rassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity."" Because double
jeopardy protection was thus intended to protect the individual
from the tyranny and power of the government, it does not pro-
See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 496.6 Id. at 491.
7 U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Court clarified the meaning of "the same offense
twice" in 1932 in Blockburger v. United States, explaining that "[a] single act may be an
offense against two statutes; and if the statute requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not ex-
empt the defendant from prosecution and punishment under the other." Block-
burger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932) (quoting Gavieres v. United States,
220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)).
8 Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957)).
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tect individuals from private suits brought by non-government
parties.
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause protects individuals from being criminally prose-
cuted more than once for the same offense.9 Protection from
subsequent or "successive" criminal prosecutions extends to any
party who has already been the subject of a criminal prosecution
for the same offense, regardless of the result of the first criminal
prosecution. 0 This protection is termed protection from "mul-
tiple prosecutions."
The Court has also concluded that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects individuals from the imposition of "multiple
punishments"for the same offense." A constitutional prohibition
on multiple punishments suggests that civil sanctions imposed
by the government (as well as criminal sanctions) are subject to
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 2 However, there is dissension on
this point on the Court-Justices Scalia and Thomas have criti-
cized the multiple punishment doctrine. Other scholars have
noted that the multiple punishment doctrine is problematic
from a textual perspective 4 and based on the legislative history
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution.' 5
See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,717 (1969).
1o See id.
1 See id.
'2 See Patrick S. Nolan, Comment, Double Jeopardy's Multipunishment Protection and
Regulation of Civil Sanctions After United States v. Ursery, 80 MARQ. L. REv. 1081, 1081
(1997).
'3 Most recently in the Hudson decision, Justices Scalia and Thomas indicate their
disagreement with the notion of a prohibition against multiple punishments. See
Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 496-97 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting), aff'g 
9 2
F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996). See also United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 297
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia has provided a detailed
analysis and criticism of the multiple punishment doctrine. See Department of Reve-
nue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 798-805 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See also Nolan, supra note 12, at 1104-07.
4 For example, the text "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" suggests a protection
only from successive criminal punishments, not protection from a civil punishment
(such as a monetary fine or seizure of property). See Brian L. Summers, Note, Double
Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of the Multiplicity Prohibition, 56 OHIO ST. LJ. 1595,
1605 (1995).
" Legislative history indicates thatJames Madison initially proposed the predeces-
sor of the Double Jeopardy Clause, which stated that "[n]o person shall be subject,
1999] 1009
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The idea that the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against
multiple punishments originated in Ex Parte Lange, in which the
Supreme Court held that "[i]f there is anything settled in the
jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can be
twice lawfully punished for the same offence."6 Based on the
facts of the case, however, critics have found fault with using Ex
Parte Lange as foundation for a double jeopardy doctrine against
multiple punishments, finding that justification for the resolu-
tion of the case more reasonably evolved from the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.17  However, since Ex Parte
Lange, the Supreme Court has stated repeatedly that double
jeopardy protection extends to both successive criminal prose-
cutions and other successive punishments.8
Arguing that double jeopardy protection prohibits only
multiple prosecutions, and not multiple punishments, Justice
Scalia noted in Kurth Ranch that the Court has never found
double jeopardy an impediment to imposing multiple punish-
ments in strictly criminal proceedings. 9 He concluded that
government-imposed punishments are adequately controlled by
other constitutional provisions; for example, "the Due Process
except in cases of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the
same offence." Summers, supra note 14, at 1607-08 (alteration in original). The Sen-
ate revised the text to read that no person shall "be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb by any public prosecution." Id. at 1608. Much of the Senate's draft was incorpo-
rated into the Fifth Amendment as it exists today, and "only Madison's initial draft as
proposed in the House used the term 'punishment,' and the reference to multiple
punishments for the same offense is nowhere to be found in the Senate version or the
final wording that exists today." Id. Justice Frankfurter has also suggested that legis-
lation providing for criminal and civil sanctions for the same conduct was common
during the drafting of the Fifth Amendment, and that the drafters would have spe-
cifically prohibited "multiple punishments" had this been their intent. Id. at 1609.
16 Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168 (1873). See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 798-800
(ScaliaJ., dissenting) (discussing Ex Parte Lange and multiple punishments).
1
7 Ex Parte Lange involved an individual sentenced to a year of imprisonment and a
$200 fine for stealing mail bags. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. at 164. The judge in the
case was authorized by federal statute to sentence the defendant to either a fine or a
prison term, and the petitioner pled for habeas corpus relief. See id. at 163. See also
Summers, supra note 15, at 1610-12.
" See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488
(1997); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 399 (1938). See also Summers, supra note 14, at 1610.
'9 See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 801 (Scalia,J., dissenting).
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Clause 2° keeps punishment within the bounds established by the
legislature, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishments and Exces-
sive Fines Clauses2' place substantive limits upon what those leg-
islative bounds may be."2
Until 1989, the Supreme Court generally ignored the mul-
tiple punishment doctrine, relying chiefly on the multiple
prosecution doctrine for its double jeopardy analysis. 3 While
the Court did consider that imposition of a civil sanction could
be barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, it did so within the
analytical framework that the civil sanction imposed was not "es-
sentially civil" but "essentially criminal," and thus constituted an
illegal second criminal prosecution.24 Not until the late 1980's
did the Court specifically invoke the prohibition against multi-
ple punishments as an independent constitutional basis for a
double jeopardy claim.25
B. DOUBLEJEOPARDYDOCTRINE: FOCUSING ON THE PROBLEM OF
"MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS"
Prior to United States v. Halper,26 the Supreme Court consis-
tently used a statutory construction test to determine whether
the imposition of a civil sanction could violate the Double Jeop-
ardy ClauseY.2  The statutory construction test was formulated in
Helvering v. Mitchell in 1938.28 In Mitchell, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue determined that Mitchell had attempted to
fraudulently evade a tax payment, and notified Mitchell that he
would be required to pay the deficiency as well as a penalty for
" No person "shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
" Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 803 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
2' See Summers, supra note 14, at 1607.
21 See infra notes 33-35, 45-46, 54, 60 and accompanying text.
See Summers, supra note 14, at 1606. The Halper Court found that the prohibi-
tion against multiple punishments precluded imposition of a civil fine following a
criminal punishment. See infra notes 69-88 and accompanying text. The Court fur-
ther relied upon the multi-punishment doctrine for its decision in Montana v. Kurth
Ranch. See infra notes 89-105 and accompanying text.
26 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
See Summers, supra note 14, at 1596-97.
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
1999] 1011
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
committing tax fraud.2 Mitchell had previously been criminally
indicted for tax evasion arising from his failure to submit the al-
leged deficiency and had been acquitted of all charges.
0
Mitchell claimed protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause,
contending that the penalty assessed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue was a criminal penalty intended to punish him
for the allegedly fraudulent act.
31
The Court indicated that "[u]nless this sanction was in-
tended as punishment, so that the proceeding is essentially
criminal," the Double Jeopardy Clause would provide no bar to
the civil sanction. The Court developed a statutory construc-
tion test to assess the "essential" nature of the civil sanction: if
the sanction was provided for by a statute that was "civil in na-
ture," then double jeopardy protection would not extend to the
civil proceeding.3  Using the statutory construction test, the
Court determined that the penalty imposed by the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue was "civil" and thus a permissible ac-
tion under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 4 The Court also
distinguished sanctions which were "remedial" in nature from
those which were "punitive" in nature.35
The Court confirmed the validity of the statutory construc-
tion test in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess in 1943.36 The peti-
tioners in Hess were electrical contractors who were indicted for
defrauding the government through collusive bidding. They
pleaded nolo contenderem and were fined $54,000.39 Following
' See id. at 395. The deficiency amounted to $728,709.84, and the penalty for
committing tax fraud was 50% of the deficiency. See id.
"See id. at 396.
3 See id. at 398.
2 Id. at 398-99.
' Id. at 399-404. The statutory construction test became the standard for the
Court's analysis of subsequent cases involving the applicability of double jeopardy
protection to civil sanctions and proceedings. See Summers, supra note 14, at 1596-97.
"SeeMitchel 303 U.S. at 405.
See id. at 399-401.
See317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943).
-1 See id. at 539.
"A plea of nolo contendere has a similar legal effect as a guilty plea, but unlike a
guilty plea, a plea of nolo contendere may not be used against a defendant in a civil
action based on the same actions. See BLACK'S LAW DI rONARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990).
1012 [Vol. 89
DOUBLEJEOPARDY/CVIL SANCTIONS
the filing of the criminal charges, a private plaintiff brought an
action against the petitioners in the name of the United States
under the civil prong of the False Claims Act.40 Ajudgment was
issued against the petitioners in the amount of $315,000.41 The
Third Circuit reversed the judgment, finding that the fraud in
this case was not reached by the statute authorizing the qui tam
action.41 Upon review of the decision by the Court, the respon-
dents (the contractors) attempted to support the judgment of
the Third Circuit by introducing independent grounds for its
decision, including double jeopardy grounds.3  Using the
Mitchell analysis, the Hess court found that the statute at issue
was intended to be remedial, and was therefore civil in nature.4
As the civil sanction was "civil in nature," it did not constitute a
second criminal prosecution, and therefore the respondents
were afforded no protection under the Double Jeopardy
Clause.45 The Court also noted that while the penalty imposed
by the False Claims Act 46 might exceed the costs to the govern-
ment in a specific case, the civil remedy under the False Claims
Act "does not lose the quality of a civil action because more than
the precise amount of so-called actual damage is recovered."
47
9 See Hess, 317 U.S. at 545.
40 See id. at 539. Subsections 3491 and 3493 of the False Claims Act permitted "any"
person to bring a False Claims suit on behalf of the government. See id. at 540.
"[W]here such a qui tam action is brought, half the amount of the recovery is paid to
the person instituting the suit while the other half goes to the government." Id. A qui
tam action is "an action brought by an informer, under a statute which establishes a
penalty for the commission ... of a certain act, and provides that the same shall be
recoverable in a civil action, [with] part of the penalty to go to any person who will
bring such action and the remainder to the state or some other institution." BLAcK's
IAwDIC'nONARY 1251 (6th ed. 1990).
"' See Hess, 317 U.S. at 540. $203,000 was for double damages and the remainder
reflected a civil penalty of $2,000 for each of 56 violations. See id.
42 See id.
43 See id. at 548.
41 See id. at 551-52. Note that the False Claims Act is the same piece of legislation at
issue in the Halper decision, where the Court found that the statute was potentially
punitive in effect. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 452 (1989), abrogated by
118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
5 See Hess, 317 U.S. at 548-52.
The penalty for each violation was 1) $2,000 and 2) double the amount of dam-
ages sustained by the government, plus, 3) the costs of suit. See id. at 540.
47 Id at 550.
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Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, decided in 1963, was not a
double jeopardy case, but it played a major role in the develop-
ment of the "civil sanction as punishment" doctrine by question-
ing whether statutes imposing forfeiture of citizenship were
"essentially penal in character."48 The Court recommended that
when determining whether a particular sanction was "penal or
regulatory" in nature,49 the lower courts should consider:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or re-
straint, (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, (4) whether
its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribu-
tion and deterrence, (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is al-
ready a crime, (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and (7) whether it appears
excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.50
The Court indicated that "these factors must be considered
in relation to the statute on its face."5 The Court found that the
statutes at issue in Kennedy had a punitive effect because their
"primary function is to serve as an additional penalty for a spe-
cial category of draft evader."52 In subsequent cases, the Court
began to incorporate the factor list into its growing double
jeopardy analysis.
In 1980, United States v. Ward established a two-part test un-
der which all civil sanctions would be reviewed for "criminal" es-
sence capable of invoking the protections of the Fifth
Amendment.53 Ward operated an oil drilling facility in Arkan-
sas.14 When he discovered an oil leak from his property into a
tributary of the Arkansas River system,55 Ward followed the Fed-
48372 U.S. 144, 164 (1963).
"' Id. at 168.
0 Id. at 168-69.
5' Id. at 169.
52 Id. at 169-70.
53 See 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). See id. at 253 for a direct reference to DoubleJeop-
ardy. Protections under the Fifth Amendment include the right to protection from
self-incrimination, and the right to protection from double jeopardy. See also U.S.
CONST. amend. V.




eral Water Pollution Control Act regulations and reported the
leak to the Environmental Protection Agency.5 6  The Coast
Guard subsequently assessed a civil penalty against Ward in the
amount of $500.: 7 Ward appealed the penalty, claiming that the
Fifth Amendment's protection from self-incrimination should
protect him from being sanctioned for the leak.58 In consider-
ing whether Ward was entitled to protection under the Fifth
Amendment, the Court noted that certain constitutional protec-
tions, including protection against self-incrimination and dou-
ble jeopardy, would apply only to individuals facing criminal
penalties.59 The Court then considered whether the Ward sanc-
tion was remedial (and not criminal) or punitive (and crimi-
nal).6
The Court noted that in assessing the nature of a civil sanc-
tion, the first line of inquiry is whether the legislature "indicated
either expressly or impliedly" that the sanction was intended to
be civil in nature.61 The second question is whether a statutory
scheme purported to be civil is "so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate that intention."62 Ward established that while
the Kennedy factors could be helpful in considering the second
question, none of the factors would be dispositive on the ques-
tion of whether a purportedly civil sanction should be deemed a
criminal penalty.63 The Court also noted that in regard to the
6 See id.
"7 See id. at 246-47. The penalty was assessed under § 311(b) (6) of the Federal Wa-
ter Pollution Control Act. See id. at 245.
See id. at 247.
'9 See id. at 248. The Court considered whether a penalty might be "criminal
enough" to trigger the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment, without
being "criminal enough" to trigger the protections of the Sixth Amendment, the
Double Jeopardy Clause, or the other procedural guarantees "normally associated
with criminal prosecutions." Id. at 253-54. The Court declined to consider a penalty
"criminal" for one purpose and "civil" for another. See id. at 254.
See id. at 248-51. Using the Kennedy factors, the Tenth Circuit had concluded
that the statute authorizing the civil penalty was sufficiently punitive to intrude upon
the Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination. See id. at
247-48.
61 Id. at 248.
6, Id. at 248-49.
6See id. at 249.
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second question, "only the clearest proof could suffice to estab-
lish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such a ground."1
4
The Court concluded that Congress had intended the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act sanction to be a "civil" sanc-
tion, and that the prescribed use of funds collected under the
statute suggested a remedial intent.re In the absence of signifi-
cant evidence of punitive intent or effect, the Court determined
that the penalty was truly civil in nature.66
C. DOUBLEJEOPARDYANALYSIS EXTENDED TO ADDRESS THE
PROBLEM OF "MULTIPLE PUNISHMENTS"
Prior to 1989, the Court's double jeopardy analysis relied
chiefly upon the existence of a constitutional prohibition
against "multiple prosecutions. 67  The Court then changed
course with United States v. Halper and expressly invoked double
jeopardy protection from a civil sanction on the basis of the
constitutional prohibition against "multiple punishments. "68 In
particular, the Court unanimously held that a civil penalty,
while being "civil in nature,"69 could be so excessive in certain
cases as to constitute a punishment within the purview of the
constitutional protection against multiple punishments.7 The
facts of the Halper case are quite compelling and probably ex-
plain why the Court felt inspired to make this new leap.
Irwin Halper, the manager of a medical services organiza-
tion, overcharged the federal government on sixty-five occasions
for services rendered to patients enrolled in the Medicare pro-
gram.7 ' Each of the sixty-five violations involved an overcharge
Id. (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)).
See id. at 247, 254.
'6See id. at 255.
67 See Summers, supra note 14, at 1607.
"See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440-46 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct.
488 (1997), for a discussion of the multiple punishment issue. See also supra notes 12-
25 and accompanying text for a discussion of whether the Fifth Amendment actually
prohibits multiple punishments.
61 Halper 490 U.S. at 441-42.
" See id. at 443. The Court explained that a civil sanction which could not ration-
ally be said to compensate the government (the aggrieved party) for its loss could
only be considered to constitute punishment. See id. at 448.
7' See id. at 457.
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of approximately $9; thus, the government was overcharged by
approximately $585.72 Halper was convicted of criminal charges
under the False Claims Act, which prohibits "mak[ing] or pres-
ent[ing] ... any claim upon or against the United States, or any
department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious, or fraudulent."03  He was sentenced to two years in
prison and fined $5000. 7'
The government subsequently brought a civil action against
Halper under the civil prong of the False Claims Act, which
prohibits "knowingly mak[ing], us[ing], or caus[ing] to be
made or used, a false record or statement to get a false or
fraudulent claim paid or approved." 5 Under this prong, and
during the period in which Halper was making the false claims,
a violator was liable for $2,000 for each instance of violation, in
addition to an amount "equal to two times the amount of dam-
ages the Government sustains because of the act of that person,
and costs of the civil action."76 The lower courts refused to
authorize the judgment against Halper dictated by the statute
($130,000), and the government appealed the matter to the Su-
preme Court.
Agreeing that the civil component of the False Claims Act
was intended to be civil in nature, the Court indicated that the
"statutory construction" test was not dispositive in all cases and
that "the labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount im-
portance" in double jeopardy analysis.78 The Court emphasized
that true protection from double jeopardy requires a focus on
the actual impact of a sanction, rather than the statutory origin
of the sanction.7
72 See id.
7" Id. (alteration in original). See 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994).
71 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 437.
7' Id. at 438. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2) (1994). See also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303
U.S. 391, 399 (1938).
76 Halper, 490 U.S. at 438 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1982 ed., Supp. II) (amended in
1986 to require that the civil penalty be assessed at not less than $5,000 and not more
than $10,000; requiring also a sum three times the damages suffered by the govern-
ment, with some exceptions)).
77 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-40.
7 Id. at 447.
9 See id. at 447-48.
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The Halper Court held for the first time that a dispropor-
tionately large civil sanction could constitute a second punish-
ment in violation of double jeopardy."0 The Court indicated
that a civil penalty imposed following the imposition of a crimi-
nal penalty had to be rationally related to the loss suffered by
the government, and that a lack of proportionality would mean
that the sanction "may not fairly be characterized as remedial,
but only as a deterrent or retribution."" The Court remanded
the case to the district court for consideration of an appropriate
remedial civil penalty pending an evaluation of damages to the
82government.
Perhaps in an attempt to limit the scope of its new ruling,
the Court attached several limitations to the newly-expanded
double jeopardy protection. First, the Court described the Hal-
per decision as a "rule for the rare case," narrowly based on its
own unique set of circumstances.8' Second, the Court held that
the government was not prevented "from seeking and obtaining
both the full civil penalty and the full range of statutorily
authorized criminal penalties" where the penalties were assessed
in the same proceeding.8 4 Third, the Court clarified that nothing in
its opinion would preclude a private party from filing a civil suit
seeking damages for conduct that previously was the subject of
criminal prosecution and punishment.s Fourth, in his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized that under Halper the
government would not be precluded from charging a civil pen-
alty where the amount of the civil penalty bears a rational rela-
oSee id. at 449.
,Id. at 449. See Nolan, supra note 12, at 1094.
82 See Halper, 490 U.S. at 452.
3 Id. at 449.
Id. at 450. Theoretically there would be less opportunity for abuse of power and
harassment where all penalties were assessed against the individual in one forum.
The Court stated that "[i] n a single proceeding the multiple-punishment issue would
be limited to ensuring that the total punishment did not exceed that authorized by
the legislature." Id.
"This is "the O.J. Simpson question." In other words, nothing would prevent a
private plaintiff from bringing a suit for damages against an individual previously sub-
jected to criminal prosecution for the same conduct. In the same vein, the Court de-
clined to express an opinion as to whether a qui tam action brought by a plaintiff in




tionship to the damages suffered by the government. 6 The ma-
jority opinion left to the trial court "the discretion to determine
on the basis of such an accounting the size of the civil sanction
the Government may receive without crossing the line between
remedy and punishment." 7 Despite these limitations, some
commentators complained that Halper had opened the door to
a broad new field of spurious double jeopardy claims.88
The Court invoked the prohibition on multiple punish-
ments again in Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch
in 1994.89 Some critics suggested that Kurth Ranch "confirmed
the potentially broad scope of the Halper rationale for invalidat-
ing civil penalties that were imposed along with criminal sanc-
tions.""° The opinion expanded double jeopardy protection
against imposition of multiple punishments by invalidating a
state tax on marijuana, indicating for the first time that a tax
could be considered a punishment under the double jeopardy
doctrine."'
Montana law enforcement officials raided the Kurth ranch
and confiscated a number of marijuana plants.92 After six mem-
bers of the Kurth family pleaded guilty to drug charges, 93 the
Montana Department of Revenue attempted to collect from
them almost $900,000 for a state tax imposed on the possession
and storage of "dangerous drugs."94 The Kurths contested the
tax assessment and challenged the constitutionality of the tax in
a bankruptcy court proceeding.95 The bankruptcy court, relying
on Halper, held that the tax assessment was intended to serve as
deterrence and as a punishment, and that it was therefore a
m See id. at 452-53.
87 Id. at 450.
8 See generally, Sarah Jean Watterson, Note, Putting the Halper Genie Back in the Bottle:
Examining United States v. Ursery in Light of Halper, Austin, and Kurth Ranch, 1997
BYU L. REV. 235, 247.
89 See Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
' Nolan, supra note 12, at 1096. SeeWatterson, supra note 88, at 248.
9' See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779, 784.
See id. at 771.





second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 96
The Kurth Ranch majority started its inquiry by considering
whether a tax could be termed punitive in nature, and thus po-
tentially violative under the double jeopardy doctrine.97 While
noting that tax statutes most often serve a revenue-raising pur-
98pose, the Court found that it had recognized in past cases the
potential for a tax to become "a mere penalty with the charac-
teristics of regulation and punishment."" The Court considered
the extent to which the Montana Dangerous Drug Tax deviated
from a traditional tax, and found that a number of conditions
suggested that the tax was intended to have punitive effect. 00
The Court found that the Dangerous Drug Tax had a "re-
markably high" taxation rate;10' that the tax was conditioned on
the commission of a crime and necessarily followed the arrest of
an individual for possession of a "dangerous drug;"'0 2 and that
the tax was levied on property that the taxpayer no longer pos-
sessed.10 3 The presence of these characteristics led the Court to
conclude that the tax was properly characterized as punishment
and therefore constituted an illegal second punishment for
double jeopardy purposes.0 The Court declined to consider
whether the tax was an acceptable and proportionally reason-
able civil penalty under the Halper test, finding that the method
of tax assessment was far removed from serving the remedial
purpose of addressing the state's damages.' °5
Opponents of the expanded double jeopardy protection
were relieved to see the Court's decision in United States v.
See id.
9' See id. at 778-79.
See id. at 779-80.
Id. at 779 (citing A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 46 (1934) (citing
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922))).
,' See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780-83.
... Id. at 780. The court noted that while the market value for "shake" (the less
valuable portions of the marijuana plant) was estimated to be $200/lb, the tax on
shake was assessed at $1,600 per pound. See id. at 774 n.12.
102 See id. at 781.
'03 See id. at 783.




Ursery,'1 which some read as a reversal of the new direction
taken in Halper and Kurth Ranch.107 In Ursery, the Court affirmed
past decisions making double jeopardy protection inapplicable
to civil forfeitures,' 8 finding that civil forfeitures imposed on the
defendants would not constitute punishment implicating the
Double Jeopardy Clause.'09 After officials discovered a mari-
juana manufacturing operation in Ursery's home, the govern-
ment filed a civil forfeiture suit to claim the home.110 Shortly
before he settled with the federal government on the civil forfei-
ture issue, Ursery was indicted for manufacturing marijuana."'
He was subsequently convicted of criminal charges and sen-
tenced to sixty-three months in prison. Ursery appealed the
criminal conviction on grounds that the criminal sentence con-
stituted an impermissible second punishment under the Double
Jeopardy Clause, theorizing that the civil forfeiture action
should count as a first punishment."8 The Court of Appeals re-
versed Ursery's criminal conviction, concluding that protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause would issue for a criminal
conviction following a forfeiture action.'"4 The Supreme Court
consolidated Ursery's case with another case and granted cer-
tiorari to consider the applicability of double jeopardy princi-
ples to civil forfeitures.""
In deciding the case, the Court referred to a line of cases
reviewing in rem civil forfeitures under the double jeopardy doc-
trine."6 The Court concluded that it had historically made clear
"6 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
107 SeeWatterson, supra note 88, at 252.
10" SeeVarious Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); see
also Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465
U.S. 354 (1984), One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409
U.S. 232 (1972).
See Ursey, 518 U.S. at 270-71.
,,0 See id. at 271. The government was entitled to file a civil forfeiture claim on
Ursery's home because it played a part in the commission of a crime, i.e., it was the
locus for a drug manufacturing operation. See id.
". See id. Ursery eventually paid $13,250 to settle the forfeiture claim. See id.
112 See id
113 See id.
114 See id. at 270.
"'See id. at 270-71.
116 See id. at 274-79.
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that civil forfeitures would not constitute "punishment" under
the double jeopardy doctrine" 7 "In rem civil forfeiture is a re-
medial civil sanction, distinct from potentially punitive in perso-
nam civil penalties such as fines, and does not constitute a
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause." ' Finding that
the courts of appeals were interpreting the Halper and Kurth
Ranch decisions as a signal that all civil sanctions were to be con-
sidered under a new test, the Court distinguished those earlier
decisions by noting that neither dealt with the subject of Urseyy:
the vulnerability of in rem civil forfeitures under the Double
Jeopardy Clause."9 The Court noted that its position through-
out history was that in rem civil forfeitures always have a remedial
civil purpose, and thus do not offend the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 1
The Court then addressed the facts of Ursery using the two-
part test established in the Ward case and subsequent civil forfei-
ture cases.' 2' First, the Court determined that Congress had in-
tended the forfeiture statutes to be remedial in nature. 2
Second, the Court determined that the forfeitures in the Urseiy
case were not so punitive in form and effect as to transform
them into punitive criminal sanctions for double jeopardy pur-
123poses. In addition to considering the Kennedy factors, the
Court considered the important nonpunitive goals served by the
statute. 4 The Court found that the evidence fell far below the
"clearest proof' necessary to show that proceeding was criminal,
and held that "these in rem forfeitures are neither 'punishment'
nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
"12
In summary, the Court's interpretation of the double jeop-
ardy doctrine prior to Hudson was evolving into a ban on multi-
7 See id. at 279.
"'Id. at 278.
' See id. at 279-88.
'20 See id. at 274-78 (discussing Various Items of Personal Property v. United States,
282 U.S. 577 (1931)).
121 See id. at 288.
'22 See id. at 288-89.
123 See id. at 290-92.
124 See id. at 290-91.
' Id. at 292.
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ple punishments. While the Court had determined that civil
forfeitures would not be considered punishment for the pur-
poses of double jeopardy, civil penalties would be evaluated for
punitive value where they seemed not rationally related to the
goal of compensating the government for a loss.1 2 6 In the wake
of Kurth Ranch, it also seemed that in rare instances, a tax could
be deemed a punishment for the purposes of a double jeopardy
analysis.
127
Ill. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During the 1980's, the three petitioners in this case held re-
sponsible positions in two western Oklahoma banks. John Hud-
son was the chairman and controlling shareholder of the First
National Bank of Tipton, in Tipton, Oklahoma ("Tipton") and
the First National Bank of Hammon, in Hammon, Oklahoma
("Hammon") . Jack Rackley was the bank president at Tipton
and on the board of directors at Hammon, and Larry Baresel
was on the board of directors at both Tipton and Hammon.'2
In February of 1989, the OCC notified the petitioners, via a
"Notice of Assessment of a Civil Money Penalty," of its charge
that they had used their positions as bank officials to arrange
loans in violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84 and § 375b.'5 The OCC al-
leged that during 1986 and 1987, the petitioners had arranged
for twenty-one loans to be unlawfully made by Tipton,
Hammon, and other institutions to third parties for Hudson's
personal financial gain.13 1 The OCC alleged that the transac-
tions had caused approximately $900,000 in losses to the Fed-
"' See supra notes 68-70, 78-87 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's
double jeopardy analysis with regard to civil penalties; see supra notes 121-126 and ac-
companying text for discussion of the Court's double jeopardy analysis with regard to
civil forfeitures.
" See supra notes 91, 97-105 and accompanying text for discussion of the Court's
double jeopardy analysis with regard to the Montana Dangerous Drug tax.







eral Deposit Insurance Corporation. 3 2 The OCC found that the
loans were "attributable" to Hudson and the petitioners under
OCC regulations,33 and that the petitioners had caused the
banks under their direction to exceed the limit of total unse-
cured loans that the banks could make to an individual.'1 The
OCC also determined that petitioners had caused the banks to
exceed the limit on money that the banks were permitted to
lend to "certain insiders" absent prior approval of the board of
directors.'3 5 The OCC concluded that the petitioners had vio-
lated 12 U.S.C. § 84 and § 375b, and assessed civil penalties in
the amount of $100,000 against Hudson and $50,000 each
against Rackley and Baresel .
In August of 1989, the OCC issued a "Notice of Intention to
Prohibit Further Participation" against each of the petitioners. 7
The Notice stated that the Comptroller had concluded that the
petitioners had demonstrated "a willful and continuing disre-
gard for [the] safety and soundness" of the two banks. 3 This
conclusion was based on the allegations which formed the basis
of the money penalty assessment 39 On the basis of this mis-
conduct, the OCC sought to prohibit each of the three petition-
ers "from further participation, in any manner, in the conduct
of the affairs of any insured depository institution.' 4 °
Each of the petitioners subsequently entered into a Stipula-
tion and Consent order with the OCC.14 ' In those orders, peti-
tioners agreed to the imposition of reduced civil monetary
penalties: $16,500 against Hudson, $12,500 against Rackley, and
$15,000 against Baresel. They also signed a "nonparticipation
1"' See United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir. 1996), revjg 879 F. Supp.
1113 (W.D. Okl. 1994), afd, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
"'Brief for Petitioners at 4, Hudson (No. 96-976).
In violation of 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1994).
In violation of 12 U.S.C. § 375b (1994).
' See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Hudson (No. 96-976).








agreement," stipulating that, absent "prior written consent of
both the Comptroller and [other relevant regulatory officials],"
they would not "participate in any manner" in the affairs of, inter
alia, any insured depository institution, any institution treated as
an insured bank, any insured credit union, or any institution
chartered under the Farm Credit Act of 1971.143 The agree-
ments were executed in October and November of 1989. TM
In August of 1992, a grand jury for the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma issued a twenty-two
count indictment against the petitioners.4 5  The grand jury
charged the petitioners with misapplication of funds in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 656 and § 2, and with conspiracy to misapply
bank funds and to make false entries in bank records in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 371.146 The indictment also charged Rackley
with two substantive counts of making false bank entries in vio-
lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1005. 7 The charges were issued for the
same series of transactions in 1986 and 1987.148
Each petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charges on
double jeopardy grounds.49 The motions rested upon the the-
ory that double jeopardy protection would be extended in a
case where the "double prosecution" was in the form of a civil
and subsequent criminal prosecution. The Western District
Court of Oklahoma consolidated the three motions, and denied
them, relying on Halper for its reasoning.50 The court held that
the nonparticipation agreement and money sanctions imposed
by the OCC were "solely remedial" in nature, and thus were
1 Id. Explicit language in each agreement indicated it did not preclude "any
right, power, or authority of any other representatives of the United States, or agen-
cies thereof, to bring other actions deemed appropriate." Id. at 5 n.2.
'4 See id. at 5.
" See id., Joint Appendix at 6-38.
146 See id.
147 See id.
'" See United States v. Hudson, 879 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Okl. 1994), reu'd, 92 F.3d
1026 (10th Cir. 1996), aft'd, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
19 SeeUnited States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1994).
"90 See id. The U.S. District Court of Western Oklahoma filed an order denying the
motions on March 25, 1993. See Brief for Petitioners at 6-7.
1999] 1025
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
permissible as civil sanctions and would not foreclose later
criminal prosecution.1
The petitioners appealed denial of their motion to dis-
miss.152 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
noted that its duty was to determine whether either sanction
constituted "punishment" under double jeopardy standards.'
The court concluded that a sanction could be termed punish-
ment if it were not "solely" remedial.1 54 Thus, if the sanction
served punitive or deterrence goals, and as such was not "solely
remedial," the sanction was "punishment" for the purpose of
the double jeopardy analysis. 55 The court affirmed the lower
court's decision that the nonparticipation sanction was remedial
because it "was solely designed to protect the integrity of the
banking industry by purging the system of corrupt influences.' 56
However, it found that the money sanction was assessed in a
manner which suggested that the OCC intended a punishment
and deterrent effect. 57 Finding that the money sanction might
as such be termed punishment, the court remanded the case to
the district court for a determination of "the precise injury
caused to the Government for which the sanctions are the rem-
edy."58
On remand, the district court held a hearing to determine
whether the money sanctions assessed against the petitioners
constituted a punishment under double jeopardy principles.' 59
The Assistant Director of the Enforcement and Compliance Di-
vision of the OCC testified that the civil money penalties as-
.. See Hudson, 14 F.3d. at 539. The District Court alternatively concluded that the
petitioners had waived any future double jeopardy claims by agreeing to the language
in the Stipulations. See id. See also supra note 143 and accompanying text. The Court
of Appeals reversed this decision, finding that the language in the Consent Orders
could not act as a valid waiver. See Hudson, 14 F.3d at 539.
1 See id. at 538.
See id. at 540.
15 See id.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 542-43.
157 See id. at 543.
158 Id.
"9 See United States v. Hudson, 879 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D. Ok. 1994), rev'd, 92 F.3d
1026 (10th Cir. 1996), aff'd, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
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sessed against the petitioners were not intended to provide resti-
tution to the government, but "to deter future violations of law
or encourage the correction of existing violations."' The wit-
ness went on to state that such penalties were reserved for willful
violations. 161  The government presented evidence reflecting
that its investigation cost approximately $72,000.162 Finding no
evidence that the investigatory costs were considered in the cal-
culation of the penalties, the court concluded that the penalties
were assigned at least in part for deterrence reasons, and were
certainly not assigned "solely for remedial reasons."63 The court
further noted that the government conceded that the indict-
ment and consent order were based on the same loan transac-
tions, and that the Blockburger precedent should preclude the
government from pursuing a criminal remedy in the case.'r
Based on these findings, the district court granted the petition-
ers' motion to dismiss the criminal indictments.'6
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision, relying on United
States v. Halper, and finding that the actual fines imposed by the
government (totaling $44,000) were not so grossly dispropor-
tionate to the proven damages to the government ($72,000) as
to render the sanctions "punishment" for double jeopardy pur-
poses.'6 The court stated that "[u]nder the objective test out-
lined in Halper, a particular sanction is not punishment when it
bears a rational relation to the goal of compensating the gov-
ernment for its loss.' '167
16, Brief for Petitioners at 9, Hudson (No. 96-976). See also Hudson, 879 F. Supp. at
1115-16.
161 See Brief for Petitioners at 9, Hudson (No. 96-976). See also Hudson, 879 F. Supp.
at 1115-16.
112 See Hudson, 879 F. Supp. at 1116.
1I d.
See id. at 1114-15.
"' See id. at 1116.
"'See United States v. Hudson, 92 F.3d 1026, 1029-30 (10th Cir. 1996), revg 879 F.
Supp. 1113 (W.D. Okl. 1994), afid, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
117 Id. at 1028 (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-51 (1989), abrogated
by 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997)). Having concluded that the civil sanctions did not constitute
punishment, the court declined to reach the question whether the civil sanctions




The Supreme Court granted certiorari "because of concerns
about the wide variety of novel double jeopardy claims spawned
in the wake of Halper."1e
IV. SUMMARY OF THE OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
On December 10, 1997, the Supreme Court denied the pe-
titioners in Hudson the protection of the Double Jeopardy
Clause.'69 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist dis-
avowed the methodology developed in the Halper opinion and
reaffirmed the test established in Ward.'70 The Court responded
unanimously with respect to the judgment in the Hudson case, 7'
but Justices Scalia, Thomas, Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Gins-
burg signed concurring opinions which vary in their support for
the conclusions reached in the majority opinion.
Before submitting the Hudson facts to the Ward test, Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated five major criticisms of the Halper deci-
sion.1 First, he reproved the Halper Court for deviating from
traditional double jeopardy principles by bypassing the thresh-
old question of whether the successive punishment at issue is a
criminal punishment.'73 Stating that the Double Jeopardy Clause
precludes only multiple criminal punishments for the same of-
fense, the Chief Justice cited a line of doctrine dating to the
Mitchell decision. 74 Second, he blamed the Halper court for fo-
"a Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997), aff'g92 F.3d 1026 (10th Cir.
1996).
169 See id. at 496.
170 See id. at 491. The Ward test requires two steps: first, the determination under
statutory construction principles of whether the sanction was intended to be criminal
or civil, and second, if the sanction was intended to be civil in nature, the determina-
tion (using the Kennedy factors) of whether the sanction is so punitive, either in pur-
pose or effect, to rise to the level of a criminal punishment. United States v. Ward,
448 U.S. 242, 248 n.49 (1980). See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text for a
fuller description of the original Ward test.
'17 See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 491.
,7 See id. at 494-95.
' See id. at 494.
'7' See id. at 493 (citing Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938); United
States ex reL Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1943)).
1028 [Vol. 89
DOUBLEJEOPARDY/CVIL SANCTIONS
cusing exclusively and dispositively on one of the six factors pre-
scribed by the Kennedy test-the extent to which a sanction "ap-
peared excessive in relation to its nonpunitive purposes."175
Third, ChiefJustice Rehnquist criticized the Halper decision
for focusing on the actual effects of the sanction.7 6 Under his
reading of the Kennedy opinion, the court is required to evaluate
the statute for punitive value "on its face."' Suggesting that the
Halper decision required the Court to look at the actual effect of
a sanction, the ChiefJustice pointed out a concern that where a
second sanction to be imposed is criminal, a court would have
to wait for imposition of a verdict before determining that a pe-
titioner should have protection from the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 78 He indicated that subjecting a defendant to a com-
plete criminal trial would fail to protect him from a second
prosecution.'7
Fourth, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that the Halper
decision created an unworkable test for determining whether a
sanction was "punitive,"'w finding that subsequent case prece-
dent (including Kurth Ranch and Urseiy) establishes that all civil
penalties have some deterrent effect and that no civil penalties
can be said to be purely remedialY.8  Finally, noting that indi-
viduals are already protected from "irrational" sanctions and ex-
cessive civil fines by other provisions of the Constitution, the
Chief Justice asserted that any additional protection from
prosecution provided by Halper provided did not justify the con-
cern and confusion generated in the lower courts by attempts to
implement the Halper standard.8
' Id. at 494.
175 See id.
177 id.
'7 See id. at 495.
179 see id.
"0 See id. at 494.
... See idt at 494-95 (citing Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511
U.S. 767, 777 n.14 (1994); citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 285 n.2
(1996)).
182 See id. at 495. The ChiefJustice seemingly finds adequate protection against the
imposition of "irrational" sanctions and excessive civil fines within the Fourth




Abandoning the Halper precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist
elected to apply "traditional double jeopardy principles" to the
Hudson case using the Ward test.18 3 He described the two-step
Ward test as follows: first, the Court must determine whether the
legislature intended the sanction at issue to be civil in nature. 4
This assessment can be made from the expressed or implied in-
tent of the legislature.'5 Second, if the Court determines that
the sanction was intended to be civil in nature, then it must de-
termine whether the sanctions are so punitive as to render them
criminal despite congressional intent to the contrary.1 6 In mak-
ing this determination, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the
Court should use the Kennedy factors, considering them "in rela-
tion to the statute on its face."187 The ChiefJustice further man-
dated that the petitioner provide "the clearest proof' of the
sanction's punitive nature to override congressional intent."
In imposing the Ward test, Chief Justice Rehnquist found
that Congress intended the money and debarment sanctions in
the Hudson case to be civil in nature.'8 9 Support for this proposi-
tion is implied by congressional conferral of authority to sanc-
tion on the OCC, an administrative agency.19 He then reviewed
the nature of the sanctions under the Kennedy factors, and con-
cluded that neither sanction has historically been viewed as pun-
ishment,19' and neither is an affirmative disability or restraint.1 92
In doing so, he noted that although the sanction may deter oth-
ers from committing similar conduct, the presence of this goal
is insufficient to render a sanction criminal.93 Chief Justice
Rehnquist then found that there existed inadequate evidence-
and certainly not "the clearest proof' required by the Ward
185 Id.





,89 See id. at 495.
19 See id.
1 See id.




test-to support a finding that either the money or debarment
sanction were so punitive as to render them criminal."' Upon
concluding that the sanctions are not criminal in nature, the
Chief Justice found that the Double Jeopardy Clause was "no
obstacle" to the trial of the petitioners on criminal charges.'95
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S CONCURRENCE
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia enthusiastically
agreed that the Halper test for whether a sanction is punitive was
"ill-considered and unworkable."'96 However, Justice Scalia re-
fused to fully endorse the "state of law" adopted by the majority
opinion because to do so would acknowledge a constitutional
prohibition against multiple punishments. 7  He declined to
agree that "multiple punishments" are prohibited by the Double
Jeopardy Clause, finding instead that the constitutional prohibi-
tion extends simply to "multiple prosecutions."'98 Justice Scalia
ended his concurrence by indicating that because the majority
opinion would require successive prosecutions to trigger double
jeopardy, he believed that the position adopted by the majority
decision was "as harmless" as the state of the law existent before
Haper.9'9
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' CONCURRENCE
Although he did concur in the judgment, Justice Stevens of-
fered a strong critique of the majority opinion. Justice Stevens
found fault with the majority opinion on several grounds: first,
for using the Hudson case to reverse the Halper decision;2°° sec-
ond, for its assessment of the Halper test as "unworkable" and a
destructive precedent;20 1 and third, for seemingly abandoning
14 See id.
195 Id.
"6 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia was joined by Justice
Thomas.
197 See id. (ScaliaJ., concurring in judgment).
' Id. at 496-97 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (referencing his discussion of
"putting the Halper genie back in the bottle" in Department of Revenue of Montana v.
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 804 (1994) (ScaliaJ., dissenting)).
"'See id. at 497 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
See id. at 497-98 (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
2' See id. at 498-99 (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
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the Halper approach and for suggesting to the lower courts that
double jeopardy protection can rarely be applied to civil sanc-
202tion cases.
Justice Stevens argued that the Hudson case was not an ap-
propriate forum for the resolution of the Court's concerns
about Halper.2'3 He noted that the case should have been easily
decided using the Blockburger precedent,2 4 and that concerns
about Halper would have been more appropriately addressed in
a case that was either incorrectly decided or raised a close or dif-
ficult question.205 Claiming that review of the case would
"amount to little more than an advisory opinion," Justice Stev-
ens criticized the Court for reviewing the case out of concern
about "evolving claims under Halpel' rather than as an attempt
to correct the decision of an inferior court.0 6
Justice Stevens also took issue with the Court's suggestion
that Halper was a destructive precedent, indicating that the
Court's opinion "seriously exaggerate[d] the significance of
[its] concerns."2 07 Although the Court expressed a concern that
the Halper decision had opened the door to opportunistic mis-
use of double jeopardy protection, Justice Stevens argued that a
review of the implementation of the Halper decision by the
lower courts illustrated that the Court's concerns were un-
See id. at 499 (Stevens,J, concurring in judgment).
2' See id. at 498-500 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
2 See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens character-
ized the Blockburger test as a "same elements" test, finding that the two provisions are
not the "same offense" if one contains an element not included in the other. Id.
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As the civil and criminal statutes in this case
required different proofs, Justice Stevens found that the civil and criminal charges
were clearly distinct and that the Double Jeopardy Clause should have presented no
bar to criminal prosecution. See id. (Stevens,J., concurring injudgment). Writing for
the majority, ChiefJustice Rehnquist dismissed the Blockburger issue as a non-issue and
outside of the scope for which certiorari was granted. See id. at 494 n.5.
2" See id. at 497 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
0 Id. at 497-99 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens also dis-
missed the majority's concern about the ordering of "punishments"-criminal, then
civil-because they did not arise in this case. See id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment). In this case, the civil sanctions were administered first-if the charges now
were on the same offense as that already sanctioned (meaning no Blockburger issue),
then double jeopardy would absolutely have barred the criminal indictment from
proceeding. See id. at 498 (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
"7 Id. (Stevens,J, concurring in judgment).
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founded. 0 8 According to Justice Stevens, the cases that the ma-
jority opinion had cited to support its concern reflected opin-
ions in which the courts of appeals had rejected double
jeopardy protection claims.2°9 He contended that the lower
courts had recognized and appropriately incorporated the prin-
ciple that Halper was intended to be "a rule for the rare case...
where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific but small-
gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate
to the damages he has caused."21 °
Rejecting the majority's claim that the Halper test is "un-
workable," Justice Stevens wrote that the Court has misrepre-
sented the Halper decision by suggesting that it allowed "only
successive sanctions that are 'solely' remedial."21 1  He argued
that the express statement of Halper's holding was much nar-
rower, prohibiting only successive sanctions where "the second
sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as
a deterrent or retribution." 2 Justice Stevens also found that the
Court had clarified the narrowness of Halper's breadth in
Ursery.213 The Ursery opinion separated the question of whether a
sanction "cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose"
from the usual test for determining whether a civil sanction is
subject to the Double Jeopardy Clause, and clearly stated that
the Halper decision had not intended to supplant the latter in-
quiry with the former.14
See id. (Stevens,J, concurring injudgment).
See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Stevens noted that only one
of the rulings cited by the majority opinion reflected favorably on one of the "novel"
claims, and that the case involved the highly controversial "Megan's Law." Id. (Stev-
ensJ., concurring in judgment).
0 See generally id. at 497-500 (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
2"11 Id. at 498 (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
212 Id. at 498 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-449 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997)). Justice
Stevens quotes the express statement of the Halper holding- "We... hold that under
the DoubleJeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a criminal
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to the extent that the
second sanction may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent
or retribution." Id. (StevensJ, concurring in judgment).
2" See id. at 498 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
214 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518
U.S. 267, 285 n.2 (1996)).
1999] 1033
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Justice Stevens indicated his agreement with the majority
philosophy that the Double Jeopardy Clause does prohibit the
government from exacting multiple punishments for the same
offense, and that this prohibition can extend to civil sanctions.1 5
He surmised that this thread of the opinion would essentially
reaffirm the central holdings of the Halper and Kurth Ranch de-
cisions.1 6 According to Justice Stevens' concurrence, the Hud-
son decision departed from the Halper and Kurth Ranch decisions
chiefly by adopting the Ward multi-factor test and thus "recali-
brating" the method of determining when a civil sanction is pu-
nitive. 2 '7  Assessing the potential impact stemming from
adoption of the multi-factor test, Justice Stevens concluded that
while it would be difficult to predict the effect, the factors seem
very close to the reasoning in Halper, and the effect may be neg-
ligible. 218 The chief danger, for Justice Stevens, was that the
government and lower courts would be "unduly influenced by
the Court's new attitude [in favor of eliminating double jeop-
ardy protection for parallel civil and criminal prosecutions] .,,219
D. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment, agreed withJus-
tice Stevens that application of the Blockburger standard would
stop any inquiry into the Hudson case.220 Justice Souter agreed
that the Halper standard for identifying a punitive sanction (for
double jeopardy purposes) needed revision2 2 'noted the value
of using common criteria to assess the criminal nature of sanc-
tions under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, 222 and pointed out
that the Court had started to clarify the Halper standard in the
223Ursery decision.
211 See id. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
.. See id. (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment) (holding "that sanctions imposed in
civil proceedings constituted 'punishment' barred by the DoubleJeopardy Clause").
1,7 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
218 See id. (StevensJ, concurring in judgment).
219 Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
220 See id. at 500 (Souter, J., concurring injudgment).
See id. (SouterJ., concurring injudgment).
See id. (Souter, J., concurring in judgment).
See id. (SouterJ., concurring in judgment).
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Justice Souter indicated his acceptance of the Kennedy-Ward
"analytical scheme" subject to two caveats." First, he would re-
quire that use of the "clearest proof' standard of evidence (re-
quired to show that a civil sanction is truly criminal) be
dependent on context and a function of the strength of the
countervailing indications of the civil nature of the sanction.2
Second, he cautioned that given the rise in use of "ostensibly"
civil forfeitures and penalties, the "clearest proof' requirement
should not be as infrequently achieved in the future as it had
been in the past.
2 6
E. JUSTICE BREYER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Breyer also concurred in the judgment. 2 7 Justice
Breyer agreed with the majority and with Justice Souter that
Halper had not provided proper guidance for distinguishing be-
tween criminal and non-criminal sanctions, and further agreed
that the Ward and Kennedy opinions set forth the proper ap-
proach for assessing the nature of sanctions. 8 However, Justice
Breyer disagreed with the majority reasoning on two grounds.2 9
The first point of departure was with regard to the level of
proof required by the majority opinion ("only the clearest
proof') to "transform" a civil sanction to a criminal punish-
ment.230 Justice Breyer indicated that maintaining such a re-
quired standard of proof would not be consistent with past
Court practice, which instead saw the Court simply applying the
Kennedy factors to each situation.231 He called upon the example
of the Kurth Ranch opinion, in which the Court reviewed the
facts in light of the Kennedy factors and made its assessment
22 See id. at 500-01 (SouterJ., concurring in judgment).
n' See id. (SouterJ., concurring in judgment).
2" See id. at 501 (SouterJ., concurring injudgment).
See id. at 501 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Breyer was joined in
the opinion by Justice Ginsburg. Justice Breyer did not comment on the Blockburger
issue.
2" See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
2" See id. (BreyerJ., concurring in judgment).
m See id. (BreyerJ., concurring injudgment).
"' See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
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without reference to "the clearest proof."2 3 2 Justice Breyer found
the stated requirement of "clearest proof' to be misleading and
improper in application.2 -3
Justice Breyer further declined to support the majority in its
assertion that the lower courts should evaluate statutes only "on
[their] face" 23 rather than by "assessing the character of the ac-
tual sanctions imposed."215 Justice Breyer noted the troubling
possibility that a sanction, appearing on its face to be civil in na-
ture, could constitute criminal punishment "as applied in spe-
cial circumstances." 2 6 To illustrate this point, he pointed out
that although the civil penalty structure under the False Claims
Act was not on its face punitive, the sanctions imposed under
the law in Halper ($130,000) were grossly disproportionate to
the damage caused by the petitioner's conduct.237 Justice Breyer
noted that under the style of review urged by the majority opin-
ion in this case, petitioner Halper would have found no relief.2m
Justice Breyer found additional support for a review of "ac-
tual sanctions imposed" in the fact that Kennedy had never sug-
gested that "there may not be further analysis of a penalty as it is
applied in a particular case. 239  In fact, Justice Breyer con-
cluded, most of the confusion among the lower courts in apply-
ing the Halper decision stemmed from "the problem of
characterizing-by examining the face of the statute--the purposes
of a civil penalty as punishment" and not from the application
of doublejeopardy analysis to penalties imposed in particular
240cases.
22 See id. (Breyer,J., concurring in judgment).
"3 See id. (Breyer,J., concurring in judgment).
Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 494 (quot-
ing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 169 (1963))).
'Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment) (citing United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 447 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997)).
Id. at 502 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
17 See id. (BreyerJ., concurring injudgment).
'See id. (BreyerJ., concurring injudgment).
'9 Id. (BreyerJ., concurring in judgment).




A. THE EFFECT OF HUDSONON DOUBLEJEOPARDYPROTECTION
In his concurrence to Hudson, Justice Stevens expressed
concern that the majority opinion would give the lower courts
the impression that double jeopardy protection from civil sanc-
tions rarely could be sustained in the post-Hudson era.24' In-
deed, the criticisms levied at the Hudson majority opinion by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg all suggest a con-
cern that the majority opinion may have placed the bar too high
for those attempting to prove that a civil sanction is "punish-
ment" for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.242
A review of activity in the circuits following Hudson suggests
that this concern was well-founded. 243 Although Chief Justice
Rehnquist's approach to the double jeopardy analysis seemed
innocuous on its face,244 the decisions of appellate courts im-
plementing Hudson reflect that under the current doctrine even
very punitive civil sanctions will be considered "civil" and ex-
empt from double jeopardy protection.245 Use of the Ward test
as it was outlined in Hudson has continually resulted in a deter-
mination that: first, the sanction was intended to be civil by the
legislature; and second, there was not the "clearest proof' re-
quired to show that the civil sanction should be regarded as
criminal" for doublejeopardy purposes.
24 See id. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring injudgment).
242 See id. at 497-502 (Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, J.J., concurring).
3 See Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268 (7th Cir. 1998);
see also Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 555 (1998); Cole v. United States Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803
(11th Cir. 1998); S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupationfl Safety and Health Review Comm'n,
138 F.3d 686 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 1998).
'14 Even Justice Stevens, the strongest critic of the majority opinion, hesitated to
predict the response of the lower courts. See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 499 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment).
2 Compare Healy, 138 F.3d at 688 (holding double jeopardy principles do not pre-
clude imposition of 68 penalties for 68 violations of OSHA) with United States v. Hal-
per, 490 U.S. 435, 447 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
2146 See Cox, 138 F.3d 268; see also Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860; Cole, 133 F.3d 803; Healy,
138 F.3d 686; Lippert, 148 F.3d 974.
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Three points in the majority opinion ensure that double
jeopardy will rarely be considered an obstacle to the imposition
of civil sanctions. First, the opinion stated that reviewing courts
should first look at whether the legislature indicated either "ex-
pressly or impliedly" a preference for the civil label. 47  The
Court found that the sanctions imposed on the petitioners by
the OCC were civil in nature, and rationalized that congres-
sional conferral of authority to sanction on the OCC supported
the notion that the sanctions were civil in nature.248 Following
Hudson, a presumption has been made in some lower courts
that where a regulatory agency has the authority to issue a sanc-
tion, there exists prima facie evidence that a sanction is civil.249
The lower courts have also presumed that if the legislature in-
cludes the term "civil" in the statutory text, the statute was in-
tended to be civil in nature.20 In the post-Hudson era, the ease
with which administrative sanctions achieve classification as
"civil" assumes a new importance. This is so because under
Hudson, a petitioner claiming double jeopardy protection from
a sanction deemed to be purportedly civil must prove, under a
heightened burden of proof, that the civil sanction is effectively
"transformed" to a criminal sanction by its truly punitive na-
ture.'
This heightened burden of proof is the second hurdle cre-
ated by the Hudson double jeopardy analysis. The Hudson ma-
jority opinion declared that under Ward, "only the clearest
proof" of punitive nature would transform a purportedly civil
sanction into a criminal sanction capable of invoking double
jeopardy protection. 2 Several of the Justices expressed concern
about the ChiefJustice's invocation of this heightened standard
217 See Hudso2, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248
(1980)). This is the first part of the two-part test established under Ward and af-
firmed in Hudson.
2'8 See id. at 495.
2'9 See Cox, 138 F.3d at 272; see also Cole, 133 F.3d at 806.
' See Lippert, 148 F.3d at 976.
2"' See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 495-96.
" Id. at 493 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 249).
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of proof.23 Justice Souter warned that the "clearest proof' stan-
dard should be dependent on context and a function of the
strengths of the countervailing indications of the civil nature of
the sanction. 4 He further noted his view that with rising use of
"ostensibly" civil forfeitures and penalties, "the clearest proof'
standard might be attained more frequently than in the past.25
In a separate concurring opinion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg
indicated disapproval that the "clearest proof' standard was es-
tablished in the majority opinion, finding that the Court had
not maintained such a standard in years past.2
6
Indeed, the balancing test thatJustice Souter hoped to find
has not come to fruition. The courts of appeal have instead re-
garded Chief Justice Rehnquist's demand for "only the clearest
proof' as a signal that they should give "considerable deference"
to legislative intent.27 In Cole v. United States Department of Agri-
culture, the appellee was criminally prosecuted and acquitted of
fraud charges relating to an incident in which he allegedly mar-
keted tobacco in excess of a quota established by the Secretary
of Agriculture.2 s After his acquittal, the USDA assessed civil
penalties of almost $400,000 against the petitioner. 9 The Elev-
enth Circuit found that the penalties were intended to be civil,
and after weighing the Kennedy factors, concluded that the pen-
alties were not "by clearest proof' so punitive as to be criminal
in nature.W
The third component of Hudson which presents an obstacle
to double jeopardy claims is the importance that Chief Justice
Rehnquist placed on reading the face of the statute rather than
2's See id. at 500-01 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment); see also id. at 501 (Breyer,
J., concurring in judgment).
2" See id. (Souter,J., concurring in judgment).
2"5 Id. at 501 (SouterJ., concurring injudgment).
See id. (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment).
27 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d 860, 864 (2nd Cir.
1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct 555 (1998).
2 See Cole v. United States Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803, 804 (11th Cir. 1998).
259 See id.
Id. at 805-07. See also Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d
268, 270-74 (7th Cir. 1998); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Palmisano, 135 F.3d
860, 864-68 (2nd Cir. 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 555 (1998).
1999] 1039
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
reviewing the actual effects of the statute.261 While the lower
courts have included Hudson language about considering
whether a statutory scheme was so punitive "either in purpose
or effect" as to transform it to a criminal punishment, they have
uniformly noted and rallied around the requirement that the
Ward factors "must be considered in relation to the statute on its
face."262 In other words, by condemning the Halper opinion in
such strong terms for considering the actual impact of a civil
sanction 20 and by emphasizing that the Ward factors must be
considered in relation to the statute on its face, 64 the Hudson major-
ity communicated to the lower courts that the actual effects of a
statutory scheme are of minimal importance. Thus, the Hudson
opinion did not simply retreat from the Halper method of look-
ing at the actual effect of a civil sanction, but strongly encour-
aged the courts of appeals to look only at the statute on its face.
The lower courts following Hudson have not considered the
sanctions as imposed, and S.A. Healy Co. v. Occupation Safety &
Health Review Commission noted in particular that Hudson re-
quires courts to review the statute "as written. '26 Healy is signifi-
cant because it involves a penalty arrangement similar to the
one illustrated by Halper-where the penalty structure as written
is not overtly punitive, but where the structure as applied to
multiple violations may be punitive. 26 Healy was convicted of
three misdemeanor offenses for a willful violation causing the
death of an employee, and was fined $750,000.26? The Secretary
of Labor also cited Healy for sixty-eight violations of the Occu-
pational Safety & Health Act and regulations and imposed a
civil penalty for each violation (of not more than $10,000 for
each violation, but not less than $5,000 for each willful viola-
211 SeeHudson, 118 S. Ct. at 494.
262 See Cole, 133 F.3d at 806; see also Sa.A Healy Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm'n, 138 F.3d 686, 688 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Lippert,
148 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1998).
20 See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 494.
' See id.
Healy, 138 F.3d at 688.
See id. at 687-88.
6"7 See id. at 687.
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tion) .2 The Seventh Circuit initially held under Halper that the
civil penalty as applied was a "punishment" by double jeopardy
standards, 26 9 but on remand from the Supreme Court after Hud-
son, reluctantly found that the civil penalty as written did not rise
to the level of a "criminal" penalty.
2 70
The Cole decision also sheds an interesting light on the "ac-
tual impact" question.' Cole (the tobacco dealer) was acquit-
ted of the criminal charges relating to the conduct in question,
and denied that the conduct occurred.2  That notwithstanding,
the Eleventh Circuit found that the civil penalty (approximately
$400,000) applied in his case was not punishment, noting that
one of the "flaws" in his argument was that "the double jeopardy
inquiry focuses on the statute on its face, not on the facts of
Cole's particular case. 273
Chief Justice Rehnquist was correct to state that the Ward
decision required a review of the Kennedy factors "in relation to
the statute on its face."274 However, Justice Breyer also correctly
pointed out that the Ward opinion does not suggest that "there
may not be further analysis of a penalty as it is applied in a par-
ticular case.2 75
The Court's present double jeopardy doctrine cannot be
said to prohibit multiple punishments or multiple prosecutions.
In combination with the easy passage to classification as a "civil
sanction" and the heightened burden of proof associated with
overcoming this classification, the majority opinion in Hudson
has raised the bar so that civil sanctions are virtually beyond any
protection normally extended by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 6
21 See id.
2" See id.
27 See id. at 688.
2" See Cole v. United States Dep't of Agric., 133 F.3d 803 (11th Cir. 1998).
rn See id. at 807 n.4.
27, id.
' See Hudson v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 488, 493 (1997), affg92 F.3d 1026 (10th
Cir. 1996).
'7 Id. at 502 (BreyerJ., concurring injudgment).
27 See Troy D. Cahill, Note, The Supreme Court's Decision in Hudson v. United States:
One Step Up and Two Steps Back for Multiple Punishment Protection Under the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, 33 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 439, 464 (1998).
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B. THE DANGER POSED TO THE PUBLIC BY UNRESTRAINED USE OF
CIVIL SANCTIONS
It appears that under Hudson, double jeopardy protection
from civil sanctions will attach only in the rarest of circum-
stances.2" Those who believe that the Double Jeopardy Clause
was intended to protect against repeated prosecution by the
government believe that the Clause should provide protection
from the imposition of civil sanctions as well as criminal sanc-
278redntions. Any other reading fails to fully protect citizens from
abuse of power by the government.279  Concurring with the
judgment in Hudson, Justice Stevens wrote:
... the Government cannot use the 'civil' label to escape entirely
the Double Jeopardy Clause's command ... that proposition is extremely
important because the States and the Federal Government have an
enormous array of civil administrative sanctions at their disposal that are
capable of being used to punish persons repeatedly for the same offense,
violating the bedrock double jeopardy principle of finality.
28 0
Although Congress has long been permitted to impose both
civil and criminal sanctions,281 the "enormous array" of adminis-
trative sanctions to which Justice Stevens refers is a development
of the recent past.282 Regulatory administrative agencies have
increasingly been given the discretion to pursue either civil or
2 See id.
See Stanley E. Cox, Halper's Continuing Double jeopardy Implications: A Thorn By
Any Other Name Would Prick as Deep, 39 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 1235, 1238 (1995) (arguing
that an accurate interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause is that a defendant
"cannot twice be put in jeopardy of punishment for the same actions, regardless of
whether the punisher wears a civil or criminal hat"). See also Cahill, supra note 276, at
463-64; id, at 439 (noting the interests safeguarded by protection from double jeop-
ardy).
27 See Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 499 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
' Id. (Stevens,J., concurring in judgment).
2" See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938). "Congress may impose both
a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission." Id. Congress
has long acted as though it is authorized "to impose appropriate obligations and sanc-
tion their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the
power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking judicial power." Id.
(citing Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
"2 The Court has previously noted the expanding use of civil forfeitures and sanc-
tions. See generally Hudson, 118 S. Ct. at 501 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). See
also Cahill, supra note 276, at 442-43.
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criminal sanctions or both,283 and of late, more agencies have re-
sorted to the use of civil sanctions over criminal sanctions to
punish errant parties.s There are a variety of reasons for this
development. Regulatory agencies have been permitted to per-
form administrative penalty assessments and impose sanctions
subject only to a "limited review of the action. "2  Civil sanctions
tend to allow multiple remedies and are easier and cheaper for
the government to pursue. 28 6 Administrative agencies are also
likely to prefer civil sanctions for procedural reasons: in the civil
context the defendant is afforded less procedural protection
than in the criminal context, and the lower burden of proof
(preponderance of the evidence) in a civil trial "enhances the
Government's ability to prove wrongdoing and impose a sanc-
tion.2 8 7 Civil sanctions also more effectively penalize culpable
corporations than the array of available criminal sanctions.2
Finally, the federal courts are very deferential to the deci-
sions of administrative agencies where the issue of sanctions are
concerned.2' The courts will intervene in an agency's factual
determinations only if those determinations are not supported
by the weight of the evidence,2 and an agency's choice of sanc-
See Debra Marie Ingraham, Note, Civil Money Sanctions Barred by Double Jeopardy:
Should The Supreme Court Reject Healy ?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1183, 1188 (1997).
' See id. at 1193. See also Cahill, supra note 276, at 442-43; William Funk, Supreme
Court News, 23 ADMIN. &REG. L. NEws 12 (1998).
' See Ingraham, supra note 283, at 1189. See also Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (allowing agencies to adminis-
tratively assess sanctions).
26 See Ingraham, supra note 283, at 1189. For a discussion of the reasons adminis-
trative agencies prefer to use civil remedies, see Cahill, supra note 276, at 442-45. Per-
haps as an unfortunate byproduct of the popularity of civil administrative sanctions, it
is common to find extensive delays in agency adjudicatory decision-making. See
KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RicHARDJ. PIERCE, JR., 2 ADMiNsTRTiVE LAw TREATISE 211-12
(3d ed. 1994).
" 7Ingraham, supra note 283, at 1190-91.
m See id. at 1193-94. There are also reasons to continue imposing criminal sanc-
tions, including a public desire to punish those who break laws, the perceived ineffec-
tiveness of civil money sanctions, the deterrent effect of the threat of incarceration,
and the larger fines associated with criminal prosecutions. See id. at 1194.
"9 See generally DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 286, at 174-202.
9 See Cox v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 138 F.3d 268, 272 (7th Cir.




tion will not be overturned by a court of appeals unless the
court finds the decision to be "unwarranted in law or ... with-
out justification in fact."2 1 Further, if an agency's sanction falls
within the bounds prescribed by statute, it "must be upheld un-
less it reflects an abuse of discretion.",
2
One would expect to see the administrative agencies aug-
ment their prosecution efforts in the aftermath of Hudson, as
they recognize their new freedom to prosecute freely for both
civil and criminal sanctions. Indeed, as of this writing, an-
nouncements regarding increased prosecution efforts are be-
ginning to emerge.f5 In January of 1998, representatives of the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") announced that
the agency would begin to seek civil fines routinely in cases
where parallel criminal prosecutions are ongoing. 4 The Wall
Street Journal noted that double jeopardy concerns had pre-
vented the SEC from pursuing civil prosecution efforts in cases
where the agency was pursuing criminal prosecutions2 s SEC of-
ficials indicated their belief that, under Hudson, "the issue of
double jeopardy has largely been removed," and further, that
the SEC was now in a position to "flex our muscle." 6
There is obvious reason to be concerned about the unfet-
tered proliferation of the civil sanction in the post-Hudson era.
The lighter burden of proof for the government, less vigorous
review by the federal court system, and the lesser protections
available to the defendant all contribute to a greater burden on
the citizen and greater opportunity for governmental abuse of
power. Double jeopardy protection from the power of the State
may be needed equally in the civil and criminal arenas.
29 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm'n Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-86 (1973).
2' Cox, 138 F.3d at 272 (citing Flaxman v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n,
697 F.2d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 1983)).
2" See Paul Beckett, SEC May Seek Civil Fines in Some Cases Involving Parallel Criminal
Prosecutions, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1998, at B6; David Matthews, Prosecutors Targeting
Health Care Fraud, Bus. J. PHOENIX & VALLEY SUN, Aug. 28, 1998, at 32 (district deputy
chief of the U.S. Attorney's Affirmative Civil Enforcement Unit noting that "we've
also intensified our focus on cases in which we are prosecuting violators under both
civil and criminal statutes, concurrently").




C. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSIVE
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL PROSECUTIONS
The public's interest in freedom from successive prosecu-
tions and punishment could certainly be better served than it is
under the Hudson regime. An ideal compromise would address
both the need to review civil sanctions in light of their actual
impact as applied (established by Halper) and the desire to allow
administrative agencies to use their full power to enforce both
civil and criminal sanctions to discourage certain types of behav-
ior (achieved in Hudson). The roots for such a compromise may
be found in the Halper opinion.
Halper directed that double jeopardy protection could not
attach where civil and criminal sanctions were imposed in a sin-
gle proceeding. 7 For Halper, the only questions remaining in
such a forum involve constitutional issues other than double
jeopardy questions. s  Coordinated prosecutions of this sort
might be difficult to coordinate and would place additional
burdens on the government, but it would also afford the opti-
mal protection for individuals against a barrage of punishments
sought by the State.2 One former prosecutor argued after Hal-
per that those responsible for prosecuting civil and criminal vio-
lations should coordinate prosecution efforts to ensure that
violators are subjected to maximum penalty without implicating
double jeopardy concerns:
... problems come into being when the legislature has authorized
both civil and criminal prosecutors to wield big sticks against the same
offensive conduct. Because the legislature authorized either stick to be
swung, executive branch prosecutors and agency enforcers of the law be-
come the interpreters and implementers of congressional policy as to
who should strike first and with which weapons. ... It makes sense for
each type of enforcer to try to understand why Congress authorized the
other enforcement action, and to try to coordinate efforts, rather than to
"7 See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 450 (1989), abrogated by 118 S. Ct. 488
(1997).
Halper refers specifically to the question of whether the punishments are statu-
torily authorized-this is a Due Process question. See id. Presumably the defendant
would also retain his constitutional right to be free of Excessive Fines and Cruel and
Unusual Punishments.
' See Cox, supra note 278, at 1299-1307.
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march myopically ahead with only half of the legislative mandate. Con-
gress' primary goal, one assumes, was to effectively combat the evil for
which punishment was authorized."0
Coordinated prosecution may be the best compromise
available to address the double jeopardy issue as it pertains to
civil sanctions. Such prosecutions protect the interests of the
individual against the threat of successive and continuing pun-
ishments by the government, while addressing the public's need
to adequately and fully punish a perpetrator for crimes against
the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hudson, the Court disavowed the Halper methodology for
determining when double jeopardy protection would protect
against the imposition of a civil sanction and reverted to a form
of the double jeopardy test established in the Ward decision.
The Court affirmed that when considering whether double
jeopardy protection would issue against a civil sanction, the
lower court should consider (1) whether the legislature had in-
tended the sanction to be a civil sanction, and (2) whether the
petitioner could show "by clearest proof" that the purportedly
civil sanction was so punitive on its face as to be transformed to
a criminal sanction for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis.
In application, Hudson has proven to present just the problem
that Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg anticipated:
the courts are reluctant to term any "purportedly" civil sanction
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Lisa Melenyzer'
Id. at 1300.
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